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Abstract
The work of Deleuze and his associates has been widely discussed, and there isa burgeoning literature on the political implications for the education systemspecifically. Examples in Sweden, the UK and the USA are discussed.Deleuzian writing offers a powerful critique of educational bureaucracies, butthe work also highlights problems in connecting work with a definitephilosophical agenda to critical and political analyses of empirical processesand situations. Deleuze’s philosophical agenda leads to radical but also tohighly unconventional thinking and writing and this makes the argumentnotoriously inaccessible. Some general paradoxes in linking theory to practiceemerge through Rancière’s discussion of philosophical autonomy andheteronomy. The work of Bourdieu in particular can also help to explain thedifficulties of Deleuzian writing in terms of possible residual effects of aparticular social context – the elite French university system of the 1960s and1970s which fostered a particularly allusive style.
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Resumen
La obra de Deleuze y sus asociados ha sido ampliamente discutida, y hasurgido una literatura emergente sobre las implicaciones políticas de su obra enel sistema educativo específicamente. Aquí se analizaran ejemplos en Suecia,Reino Unido y Estados Unidos. Los escritos de Deleuze ofrecen una fuertecrítica sobre las burocracias docentes, pero la obra también destaca losproblemas en las obras vinculadas con una firme pauta filosófica con respecto alos análisis críticos y políticos de procesos y situaciones empíricas. Las pautasfilosóficas de Deleuze conducen a un pensamiento y escritura radicales y muypoco convencionales lo cual hace su razonamiento de notoria inaccesibilidad.Ciertas paradojas generales surgen al relacionar la teoría con la práctica usandola proposición de Rancière sobre la autonomía y heteronomía filosóficas. Laobra de Bourdieu en particular también puede ayudar a explicar las dificultadesen los escritos de Deleuze con relación a los posibles efectos residuales de uncontexto social particular – el sistema elitista universitario francés de lossesenta y setenta, lo cual fomenta un estilo particularmente lleno de alusiones.
Palabras clave: Bourdieu, Deleuze, Deleuze y Guattari, política educacional,pedagogía progresiva.
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social movements but also to local struggles, including those overeducational policy. Deleuzian theory offers a radical and generalaccount of politics based on concepts such as deterritorialization, linesof flight and the war machine. The aim is to develop an organizationwhich does not mirror state apparatuses, as organized parties do, but tobuild a suitably modern ‘war machine’ which will avoid turning intosomething closed and authoritarian again. Encouragingly, ‘In a certainway it is very simple, this happens on its own and every day’ (Deleuze& Parnet, 1995: 145). Deleuze and Guattari have also both supported larger radical politicalmovements, such as the grassroots Italian Autonomist Movement of the1970s and 1980s, and Deleuzian concepts seem to have beenparticularly applicable, especially the ‘body without organs’(seeLotringer & Marazzi, 1980). Guattari (Guattari & Rolnik, 2008) helpeddevelop the anarchistic Free Radio Movement in France, and alsoembarked on an extensive tour of Brazil, talking with militants andactivists organizing the Workers’ Party in their struggle to come topower: the aim was to build a popular movement based on an alliance ofvarious cultural, political and sexual minorities. Guattari and Rolnikspecifically tried to help militants identify a singularization, a particularmovement that would cause the political system to tip over into radicalchange. The term has its own context in political theory, but it couldalso be seen as a specification of the concept of a singularity inDeleuzian philosophy – a particular combination of the usually invisibleforces in a multiplicity, which, when examined properly, leads to anunderstanding of the multiplicity. Guattari and Rolnik also engaged in considerable debate withBrazilian psychotherapists about the repressive implications ofparticular kinds of Freudian theory, and Guattari discussed his ownspecific practice in the therapeutic community in which he worked inFrance (further described in Guattari, 1995). Here, it is possible to seethe theoretical work with Deleuze (Deleuze & Guattari, 1984; 2004),being extended to modern conditions, for example in the notion of ‘a­signifying semiotics... to relate to Significations and expressions that
adical theorists lose credibility if they are seen to be concernedonly with scholastic pursuits, Rancière (2002) tells us, hence theturn to radical politics. ‘Politics’ can refer not only to organizedR144 Harris ­ Deleuze and education
[technological] machines have’ (Guattari, 1995: 36 ­­37). From the other direction, radical activists also turn to theory becausethey want to argue that their positions are firmly grounded in somethingreal and of universal interest, not based just on idealism or self­interest.Feminist writers, principally in France and the USA have beenespecially interested in the work of Deleuze (and Deleuze & Guattari) inthinking out the most effective political stance for women and sexualminorities to overcome the oppression of phallogocentrism. Deleuzeand Guattari (2004) had written on the need to embark on ‘becoming­woman’ as an essential stage for everyone, including heterosexual men,in liberating themselves from conventional thinking about sex andgender. They had also discussed ‘becoming­minority’, a process ofescaping fully from repressive majoritarian conceptions and discourses.Together, these arguments seemed to promise an effective break at lastwith phallogocentrism in philosophy. Goulimari (1999) summarized the political implications of thesestrategies – broadly, whether to insist on the positive identity of‘woman’, even if still contaminated with phallogocentrism, as a basisfor political mobilization, or to opt instead for an oppositional minoritystatus (defined not numerically, but in terms of holding minorityconceptions), with no compromises with official discourses, to establisha place outside of the dominant system. This in turn implied an openand non­hierarchical relationship of alliance with other minorities,including homosexuals and queers of both sexes.
Educational applications
Deleuze seems to offer immediate support for critics of current policieswith comments that ‘[there is a] grotesque image of culture that we findin examinations and government referenda’ (Deleuze, 2004: 197). In thefamous essay on the society of control (Deleuze, 1995: 179) we read‘Even the state education system has been looking at the principle of“getting paid for results”... school is being replaced by continuingeducation and exams by continuous assessment. It’s the surest way ofturning education into a business’. The result is ‘the widespreadprogressive introduction of a new system of domination’ (1995: 182).
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 However, and as an indication of complexities to come, we also readsome warnings against identifying too early with conventionalprogressive thinking: ‘work by children’ tends to be interesting but‘extraordinarily flaky, unable to preserve [itself]’ (Deleuze & Guattari,1994: 165). It is also misleading to see such creativity in adult terms: ‘itis hardly acceptable… to run together a child’s nursery rhymes, poeticexperimentations, and experiences of madness… [and] justify thegrotesque trinity of child, poet, and madmen’ (Deleuze, 1990: 82­­83). The studies summarized below indicate some possible ways to takethis promising material further. The first two introduce Deleuzianthought, specify a number of concepts which might be particularlyuseful, and offer personal testimony about the liberating effects. The lasttwo are longer and more extended discussions, and with those we beginto see some problems, turning on moments when Deleuzian work seemsto offer implications which ‘exceed’ immediate educational practices.These problems will be developed in later sections too. In the first example, those struggling against increasing bureaucracyhave been especially encouraged by the Deleuzian argument that formalinstitutional territories in current educational organisations must alsocontain a potential for deterritorialization, a real basis for change.Teachers resisting educational organisations can become nomadic, sincethere are ‘spaces that are always shifting between the smooth and thestriated’ (Gale, 2010: 304). Gale also lists other concepts that might beuseful in informing the struggle, such as the fold, the rhizome,becoming, the assemblage and the event. In the second study, concepts like the fold, the nomad and therhizome were ‘immediately useful and helped me try to think outside[both conventional ideas of practice and] ... the overcoded qualitativeresearch process’, argues St Pierre (2004: 288). She reports that herstudents also enjoyed taking up selected Deleuzian concepts, in this case‘multiplicity, bodies–without–organs, faciality and insomnia in responseto their own problems’ (2004: 284, original emphasis), and studentsproduced ‘simply thrilling lines of flight in response’ (2004: 293). In the third example, Semetsky (2006: 12) explores Deleuze’scritique of the conventional subject and sees it as a liberating reading ofthe processes of subjectivation, escaping the ideological effects of the
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conventional American notions of ‘selfhood’ and promising a liberating‘becoming­other’. It is less clear, however, whether she would acceptthe ‘excessive’ possibility here – becoming not just another humanbeing but becoming­animal as well (discussed in Deleuze & Guattari,2004). For Deleuze and Guattari (2004), ‘becoming’ clearly departsfrom the usual educational concerns for self­development, exploring theroles of other people, and suggests something more radical and lesshumanist: connections at a virtual level between humans and the naturalworld. Semetsky thinks that people have to be motivated to accept learning ifit is challenging, and she cites Deleuze and Guattari (1994) in arguingthat it is not just concepts that are required in learning, but ‘percepts’and ‘affects’ as well. She goes on to argue that Dewey would agree onthe need to engage the arts and the emotions in generating thesenecessary components, part of her general argument that there areparallels between Deleuze and Dewey and Peirce, whose work is morefamiliar to educationalists. However, Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 164)themselves might diverge from Dewey and Peirce in saying that‘Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies inthemselves and exceeds any [human activity]... man, as he is caught instone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself [already] a compound ofpercepts and affects’. This would again imply something excessive fromthe point of view of educational practice, an external reality beyondhuman activity. For the fourth example, Olsen (2009: 101) admires Deleuzianconcepts like ‘desire, micropolitics and the event’; the singularity as'essentially preindividual, non personal and aconceptual' (2009: 115);assemblages of desire, desiring machines, collective assemblages ofenunciation; 'a­lives, virtuality, crystal time and becoming' (2009: 189).She uses these to critique conventional notions of the preschool child,the current concern in policy with pre­established outcomes, andorthodox conceptions of creativity and learning. She also cites thematerial on de­ and reterritorialization, lines of flight and rhizomes. Herdiscussion of Deleuze (1990) on the interweaving of (adult) nonsensewith sense argues that we should see children’s nonsense stories also asa general, often unrecognized, process of sense making.
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 Deleuzian thought offers direct support for the sorts of ‘collectiveintense and unpredictable experimentation… in a relational field’ (2009:50) that Olsen finds in some Swedish preschools, with childrendeveloping as independent and creative learners as they encounterunlimited events that ‘force them to think’, to use a Deleuzian phrase.They also develop their own lines of flight that permit ‘not only acreative approach to the material… But also to the existing social andgendered order’ (2009: 47). She gives a number of examples, includingone where ‘a line of flight seems to have been created when projectsfocus on the construction of problems and when this process isconsidered to be more important than the outcome’ (2009: 73). Olsen does fully recognize that the extent of Deleuze’s and Guattari’sphilosophical project exceeds immediate applications, but she claimsthat her primary interest is in pedagogy, and her primary political intentis to support those teachers engaging in experimental practice. This is acommon, self­imposed restriction on philosophizing in the name ofpractical relevance, which is widespread in educational thinkingaccording to Hodgson and Standish (2009), and which inevitably limitsthe radical potential of thinkers like Deleuze (and, in their example,Foucault). This is probably an inevitable feature in any discussion whichneeds to gain the consent of practising teachers, however, as Olsenrecognizes. Another effect of adopting too narrow a definition of relevance can beseen in the omission from all the work summarized above of Deleuze’ssubstantial work on the cinema (Deleuze, 1989; Deleuze, 1992). Cinemais also powerfully educational (in a broader sense) for Deleuze. To pickup on Semetsky’s interests, for example, Tomlinson and Galatea in theirtranslators’ introduction to Deleuze (1989: xiv) argue that‘cinema...[above all]... gives conceptual construction new dimensions,those of the percept and affect... This is... a kind of provoked becomingof thought’. For Deleuze cinema provides many examples of imagesthat make us feel as well as see and hear, and ‘produce [in visual forms]material from the outside which becomes unthinkable [in the usualways]’ (Deleuze, 1989: 178) and this forces us to think. Deleuze evenrevitalizes an early idea that cinema somehow communicatesimmediately to the audience, through their brains, ‘communicatingvibrations to the cortex, touching the nervous and cerebral system
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directly’ (Deleuze, 1989, 156). Even early cinema offered problems for conventional subjectiveperceptions with the use of slow­motion, time lapse, and ‘impossible’perspectives provided by strange camera positions. In modern cinema,film­makers deliberately break with the conventions of realism and canillustrate ‘the simultaneity of incompossible presents, or the coexistenceof not–necessarily true pasts’ (Deleuze, 1989: 131), replacing theconventional notion of a single underlying truth, with ‘an irreduciblemultiplicity’ (1989: 133). Avant­garde cinema especially has apedagogic function for Deleuze—it breaks with conventionalrepresentation and stimulates further critical and radical thought,making the audience ask questions like ‘How do the sequences formpart of an assemblage?’, at least according to Bogue (2008).
Lines of Flight
It would be useful to examine some of those concepts seen asparticularly relevant to education and to see how they are actuallyunderstood and applied. Some must be ruled out in a short article,however, on the grounds that they are discussed in particularly denseways in Deleuzian work, preventing easy summary. The rhizome, forexample, might make us think of familiar garden plants like the iris, butit is defined in Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 7) in technical ways, forexample:
The multiple must be made, not by always adding a higherdimension but ...with the number of dimensions one already hasavailable ­­ always n­1 (the only way the one belongs to themultiple: always subtracted). Subtract the unique from themultiplicity to be constructed: write at n­1 dimensions...A systemof this kind would be called a rhizome.
 Equally difficult discussion surrounds many of the other concepts too.However, terms like deterritorialization or lines of flight seem to haveapplied by most commentators, and discussion is slightly moremanageable. The terms can provide insight into some central problemsin applying Deleuzian philosophy, and they also lie at the heart of adispute between two major commentators on Deleuze and Guattari,
149RISE ­ International Journal of Sociology of Education 2 (2)
which is particularly relevant to the question of the analysis of concreteexamples. We might begin by reading that ‘... in all things, there are lines ofarticulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but also lines offlight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification... All ofthis… constitutes an assemblage… a multiplicity ‘(Deleuze & Guattari,2004: 4). Lines of flight are a necessary component of thesemultiplicities: ‘The line of flight marks: the reality of the finite numberof dimensions that the multiplicity effectively fills; the impossibility ofa supplementary dimension, unless the multiplicity is transformed bythe line of flight’ (2004: 10). It is ‘absolute’ lines of flight that transform multiplicities altogether,offering ‘absolute deterritorialization... absolute drift... flows of absolutedeterritorialization…’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 61­2). Anytransformation is likely to be resisted, however. If it threatens ‘anabsolute deterritorialization; [a] regime has to block a line of this kindor define it in an entirely negative fashion precisely because it exceedsthe degree of deterritorialization of the signifying sign… Anything thatthreatens to put the system to flight will be killed or put to flight itself’(2004: 128­9). Moreover, ‘subjectification imposes on the line of flighta segmentarity that is forever repudiating that line, and upon absolutedeterritorialization, a point of abolition that is forever blocking thatdeterritorialization or diverting it’ (2004: 148). Nevertheless, in somecircumstances, absolute lines of flight receive ‘a positive sign… [if]...followed by a people who find in it their reason for being or destiny…[For example]… In the case of the Jewish people, a group of signsdetaches itself from the Egyptian imperial network of which it as a partand sets off down a line of flight into the desert’ (2004: 134­5). Deleuze and Parnet (1987) also warn that lines of flight can lead usinto ‘black holes’, turn into ‘lines of abolition’ or end in self­destruction(1987: 140). Such personal dangers are all too real, and many writerspursuing absolute lines of flight in their art have ended with suicide orin madness. There is always some unpredictability: 'we can't assumethat lines of flight are necessarily creative, that smooth spaces arealways better than segmented or striated ones’ (Deleuze, 1995: 33). Weshould proceed with caution: ‘Is it not necessary to retain a minimum ofstrata, a minimum of forms and functions, a minimal subject from which
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to extract materials, affects, and assemblages?’ (Deleuze & Guattari,2004: 298). Reterritorialization can follow deterritorialization as a deliberatereturn to the first assemblage and the safety it offers: ‘a line of flightmust be preserved to enable an animal [in this case] to regain itsassociated milieu when danger appears’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 61).However, change may be irreversible producing another kind of line offlight 'when the associated milieu is rocked by blows from the exterior,forcing the animal to abandon it and strike up an association with newportions of exteriority, this time leaning on its interior milieus likefragile crutches’ (2004: 61). Additional complexities include:‘reterritorialization as an original operation does not express a return tothe territory but rather these differential relations internal toD[eterritorialization] itself, this multiplicity internal to the line of flight’(2004: 560 – 61).
Lines of flight as a philosophical concept
These remarks and definitions might look confusing, but they can alsobe seen as perfectly consistent with Deleuze’s and Guattari’s notion of aspecifically philosophical concept. For them, concepts are ‘fuzzy sets...aggregates of perceptions and affections… Qualitative or intensivemultiplicities… where we cannot decide whether certain elements do ordo not belong to the set’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 141). Thisundecidability arises from concepts referring not just to empirical statesof affairs but to virtual processes. Philosophical concepts are ‘vagabond,and nondiscursive, moving about on a plane of immanence’ (1994:143). They have no tight reference to the lived or the actual, but only to‘a consistency defined by its internal components… The event as puresense’ (1994: 144). Only by forming such concepts we can graspadequately the complex nature of states of affairs emerging frommultiplicities as actualities. Concepts are not simply discursive or propositional either. Indeed,philosophical concepts often appear as ‘the proposition deprived ofsense’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 22). This means philosophy is ‘in aperpetual state of digression or digressiveness’ (1994: 23). Developingsuch concepts, as pure knowledge, not tied to actual states of affairs, is
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the proper task of philosophy: 'always to extract an event from thingsand beings, to set up the new events from things and beings, always togive them a new event: space, time, matter, thought, the possible asevents' (1994: 33). By contrast, science does not create philosophicalconcepts as its main task. Science always refers to existing states ofaffairs and their conditions, while philosophy should grasp the whole ofthe lived: ‘philosophy… does not need to invoke a [specific] lived thatwould give only a ghostly and extrinsic life to secondary, bloodlessconcepts' (1994: 33). When philosophy is forced to conform torequirements of logical consistency or limit its inquiry only to livedexperience, it can only offer ‘more or less plausible opinions withoutscientific value’ (1994: 79). Philosophy requires a non­standard image of thought and this canlead to social isolation: ‘Becoming stranger to one’s self, to one’slanguage and nation, is not this the peculiarity of the philosopher andphilosophy, or their “style” or what is called a philosophicalgobbledygook?’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 110). There are otherpersonal implications : ‘In this sense, it is indeed true that the thinker isnecessarily solitary and solipsistic’ (Deleuze, 2004: 352). Asceticismand an aristocratic aloofness must ensue, according to Badiou (2000). Ifone way of putting Deleuze to work, suggested in Deleuze and Guattari(1994), means encouraging thinkers to develop a Deleuzian philosophyof their own, this would seem to require a similar level of engagementand stern commitment. Philosophy struggles with chaos as an ‘undifferentiated abyss orocean of dissemblance’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 207), but it also hasto struggle to distinguish itself from normal opinion. Repressiveopinions are also rejected, of course: philosophy must opposecapitalism, and go beyond ideology into a consideration of the infinite,‘turn it back against itself so as to summon forth a new earth, a newpeople’ (1994: 99). Because it is insufficiently separated fromconventional opinion, even earlier philosophical thought ‘conforms tothe goals of the real State, to the dominant meanings and to therequirements of the established order’ (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 13) This ontology has undoubtedly helped Deleuze address and resolve anumber of problems in the history of philosophy—to critique and movebeyond Plato, and then Kant and Hegel, to reinstate recently neglected
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philosophers such as Bergson, to rescue Nietzsche from unfortunateassociations with Nazism, and to replace one of the main tenets of‘social constructivism’ with an account of the dynamism of reality itself(Delanda, 1999). Foucault (1970) in a well­known quotation says:‘perhaps one day, this century will be known as Deleuzian... newthought is possible; thought is again possible’.
Lines of flight as an empirical concept
Using the terms to undertake empirical analysis can bring frustration,however. At the end of his own discussion about deterriorialized spacesin shopping malls, Buchanan (2006: 147) concludes ‘We are still a longway from being able to say what a Deleuzian analysis...of space might,much less should look like’ . And ‘not one of [the dozens of books onDeleuze and Guattari] can tell you how to read a text in a manner that isrecognisably Deleuzian’ (2006: 148). Deleuze himself said that we mustreturn to actual problems, ‘to create a practical, useful form ofphilosophy’ (2006: 148), but without precision, Buchanan says,Deleuze’s conceptual toolbox is useless. Lines of flight certainly could be better specified to pursue empiricalresearch. Gale (2010) or St Pierre (2004) could have fleshed out theirpersonal testimonies and told us whether they felt or observed relativeor absolute lines of flight, for example, whether the whole educationalassemblage was threatened or whether relocation within it was beingdescribed, from bureaucratic to more professionally autonomous strata. Considering the effects of relative lines of flight could probably beextended with more empirical social science research. Movements fromrigid bureaucratic roles to more flexible and autonomous ones inuniversities could simply be described as the effects of the necessarily‘loose coupling’ of university organization (Weick, 1988), for example.Here, bureaucratic and more autonomous activities have to becombined, but they can never be fully integrated, and actors can takeadvantage of this structural looseness to manage their own activity to aconsiderable extent. Areas of teaching in preschools and personalresearch at postgraduate level also feature degrees of licensedautonomy, as a part of their necessary operations, where the educationalsystem expects people to be creative. We might even suggest, with
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Bourdieu and Passeron (1990), that such autonomy and creativity arecrucial areas in maintaining the claim that universities are independentof capitalist social formations, and thus able to deliver with particularauthority an important social reproductive role for them. Olsen does distinguish absolute lines of flight from earliersegmentary lines describing forms of pupil­centred creative activity, andshe has offered an empirical basis for this distinction which mightclarify matters. Absolute lines of flight never arise from rationalplanning, but are instead ‘magic moments where something entirelynew and different seems to be coming about. This is recognized only bythe tremendous intensity, and, very often, the physical expression ofgoose bumps that take possession of participants’ (Olsen, 2007: 63). Anadditional dimension might be whether the preschool lines of flight ledto reterritorialization at later stages, and, if so, what form this took. Allthe authors might have also explored whether they could detect anemerging attempt at political reaction. Detecting signs of subsequentpersonal stress, social isolation, or even tendencies towards self­destruction might also be a major priority. Of course, empirical specification like this would mean a departurefrom strictly Deleuzian concepts, for the reasons discussed above.Demands for relevant critical applications might pull in a differentdirection to demands for philosophical and explanatory power. Ideally,to reconnect with Deleuze, any extended empirical findings of this kindwould need to be shown as actualizations, derived only from theprocesses of explication and individuation at work in the virtual,‘isomorphic with real intensive individuation processes’, in the terms ofDeLanda (2002: 171), and not driven by separate and external forces.
Deleuze’s reductionism?
This leads to an important debate between Badiou and others about theemphases in Deleuzian work. Briefly, Badiou argues that the booksDeleuze wrote before meeting Guattari and becoming politicized clearlyexpress his major interest in an ontology concerned only with therelations between the virtual and the actual in general. Since any kind ofconcrete institution and process, even fascist ones, can be seen equallyas actualized, this ontology is indifferent to politics. Even the interest in
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a wide series of applications to empirical cases is only apparent.Deleuze aimed all along at describing a single reality which can accountfor all actual differences, a single voice, ‘“a single clamor of Being forall beings”’ (Badiou, 2000: 11, quoting Deleuze’s Difference andRepetition). Despite the apparent variety of objects of analysis inDeleuzian work, these appear only as particular cases of the concept. Itis necessary to start with the cases, to suggest ‘you are compelled andconstrained by [cases]’ (2000:14), to avoid elevating the idea or conceptinto a privileged starting point, but the cases themselves are means to aphilosophical end, to reveal philosophy and its power. This givesDeleuze’s work a reductive and ‘monotonous’ character, with an‘almost infinite repetition of a limited repertoire of concepts, as well asa virtuosic variation of names, under which what is thought remainsessentially identical’ (2000: 15). This argument has been extended subsequently in several areasconcerning the arts. To take just one example, Badiou says that the hugework on the cinema shows clearly that the concepts announced at thebeginning (such as Bergson’s notions of movement and duration) persistthroughout all the massively detailed discussion, and triumphantlyemerge unaltered at the end, while ‘the specifics of the cinema graduallybecome neutralized and forgotten’ (2000, 15). However Zourabichvili(2000, 142) says Deleuze ‘considered that he could not have written [thebooks] except through contact with cinema’ in the first place. Alliez (2006) insists that Deleuzian work on lines of flightspecifically marks a break with the notion of Being as a single voice.The possible distinctions between relative and absolute lines of flightdiscussed above might give a hint of the different options. It might besuggested that Deleuze’s and Guattari’s own discussion of lines of flightmight indeed refer to empirical cases only to reveal the power ofthought. The issue is whether anyone else might be able to reverse theemphasis. Here, some account of what someone like Gale, St Pierre orOlsen actually did might be important: did they grasp the philosophicalconcepts, operationalize them in some way and then set out to test themagainst their observations, or just to affirm or recognize themimmediately? Badiou says Deleuze refused to debate this issue with him: ‘inconformity with his aristocratic and systematic leanings, Deleuze felt
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only contempt for debates’ (Badiou 2000: 17). Deleuze is indeedunwilling to test his views in an open debate with other philosophersand says ‘Philosophers have very little time for discussion' (Deleuze &Guattari 1994: 28). No­one ever talks about the same thing, and ‘whenit comes to creating, conversation is always superfluous' (1994: 28). Hehas sometimes engaged with other philosophers throughcorrespondence, but he can be seen as dismissive and patronising in hisreply to a ‘harsh critic’ (Deleuze, 1995: 8):
There are, you see, two ways of reading a book: you either see it asa box with something inside and start looking for what it signifies,and then if you’re even more perverse or depraved you set off aftersignifiers... And you annotate and interpret and question and writea book about the book [the critic seems to have done just this]... Orthere’s another way: you see the book as a little non signifyingmachine, and the only question is “Does it work, and how does itwork?” How does it work for you? If it doesn’t work, if nothingcomes through, you try another book’
 Rather than waste time debating, ‘it is better to get on with somethingelse, to work with people going in the same direction. As for beingresponsible or irresponsible, we don’t recognise these notions, they arefor policemen and courtroom psychiatrists’ (Deleuze, 1995: 24). Deleuze opts for particular concepts as a matter of ‘philosophicaltaste’: ‘it is certainly not for “rational or reasonable” reasons that aparticular concept is created’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 78). This‘faculty of taste… is ... instinctive’ (1994: 79). Rather than developingknowledge or truth, ‘it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, orImportant that determine success or failure... Only [mere] teachers canwrite “false” in the margins, perhaps’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 82,original capitalization) Badiou and Alliez also debated the collaboration between Deleuzeand Guattari. This is relevant if we accept the common view (explainedin detail in Massumi, 1992) that Guattari added more specific andpolitical concepts to Deleuzian philosophical ones. Perhaps if theyexplained how they managed this connection to their own satisfaction, itmight guide subsequent efforts to bridge the two domains. However, thedetails of what they actually did are absent. They worked ‘according to
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becomings which were unattributable to individuals, since they couldnot be immersed in it without changing qualitatively… We became lesssure of what came from one, what came from the other, or even fromsomeone else... We wanted a rhizome rather than a tree with binarylogic’ (Deleuze, 1995: x). Deleuze says that rather than discussingcommon ground with Guattari, he ‘merged’ with him so they became ‘anon personal individuality’ (1995: 141).
The social context of philosophy
Such apparent disdain for the specifics of scholarly labour, together withthe belief that some unspoken agreement might be involved, is probablysocially rooted. According to Bourdieu, work in elite Frenchuniversities, where Deleuze was located in the 1960s and 1970s, wasdominated by collective and unconscious understandings of whatcounted as proper knowledge and as effective teaching and writing.These made up an academic habitus defined (in Bourdieu, 2000: 145)as:
the site of durable solidarities, and loyalties … an immediateagreement in ways of judging and acting which does notpresuppose either the communication of consciousness, still less acontractual decision… [and]… is the basis of the practical mutualunderstanding, the paradigm of which might be the one establishedbetween members of the same team, or, despite the antagonism, allthe players engaged in a game.
 Even critical philosophers adhered to the rules of the game: they still'have a life­or­death interest... in the existence of [a] repository ofconsecrated texts, a mastery of which constitutes the core of theirspecific capital' (Bourdieu, 1986: 496). Even the 'philosophical"deconstruction" of philosophy' is really a continuation of it.Objectifying the tradition one belongs to in order to launch some criticalcommentary draws attention to philosophy and places 'the person of the[radical] philosopher at the centre of the philosophical stage' (Bourdieu,1986: 497). Although appearing as a purely technical matter of transferringconcepts and debating them, French academic education was actuallybased on an ‘arbitrary’ selection of available knowledge informed by
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cultural preferences (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979). Having observed anumber of lectures at several elite French universities, Bourdieu and hisassociates were able to identify a number of common features, evenwhere professors saw themselves as developing their own personalstyles. For Bourdieu and Passeron (1979: 42), academic work wascharacterised by ‘professorial charisma… The display of virtuosity, theplay of laudatory allusions or depreciatory silences’. Students seem tobe expected to possess a ‘whole treasury of first degree experiences’,such as extensive knowledge of literature and the arts, and to beaccustomed to 'allusive conversations' (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979: 22).The effect, which might have been quite unintended, was to deny accessto those without sufficient cultural capital and to reproduce privilege. It is very easy to see most of these features reproduced in Deleuzianwork, alongside the radical intentions. There are many allusions to theworks of writers, poets, dramatists and filmmakers, quite often barelyreferenced on the assumption that readers will just know them. Even themore technical sections are discussed in an allusive style. Deleuze andGuattari (1987) make much of famous case­studies in Freud, like that ofPresident Schreber, but only experienced academics could spot apossible ‘depreciatory silence’ about Lacan’s rather different discussionof the same case. Earlier work is also frequently used in the latermaterial—the ‘body without organs’ which became a famous concept inDeleuze and Guattari (1987; 2004) – was first discussed in Deleuze(1990), although there is no reference to guide those who were notaware of this. No doubt some elite French students of the 1960s could grasp whatwas being argued, but even some of those had problems: Bourdieu andhis associates tested elite French students in their understanding of thewords used frequently in the lectures they observed and foundsubstantial misunderstandings: for example one philosophy studentdefined ‘epistemology’ as ‘the study of memoirs, journals andcorrespondence’ (Sociology Research Group in Cultural and EducationStudies, 1980: 82). Bourdieu tells us that some students in that setting did seem to enjoyprofessorial displays in lectures, as might some current readers ofDeleuze, as a pleasurable ‘initiation into the mysteries and an infusion
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of grace’ (Bourdieu et al.,1994: 107). However, Bourdieu also notedthat students avoided being forced to think and displayed ‘[cultural]dualization or... resigned submission to exclusion’ (Sociology ResearchGroup in Cultural and Education Studies, 1980: 47). Others coped inuncomfortable ways—with a ‘rhetoric of despair’, ‘an illusion ofunderstanding’ (Bourdieu et al., 1994: 15), emulating professorialdiscourse, producing work that offered ‘manipulation of the finite bunchof semantic atoms, chains of mechanically linked words’ (1994: 14).Some learned to defend themselves by playing academic games,deploying ‘professorial rhetoric… false generalities… echolalia’ tocover misunderstanding (Sociology Research Group in Cultural andEducation Studies, 1980: 55 ­ 56). Nevertheless, students and staff worked to maintain the illusionsnecessary to academic work. These suggest that academic language is‘natural’, that lectures are aimed at inspiration, and that anyunpleasantly discordant or sceptical dialogue is to be avoided. Anydirectly instructional content is likely to be seen as vulgar and‘schoolmasterly’. This permits professors and students to address eachother as ‘fictive subjects’ (Sociology Research Group in Cultural andEducation Studies, 1980: 63) apparently sharing universal interests andaptitudes. Both groups denied the importance of hard scholarly work,and saw success arising from ‘gifts’ (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979: 65). Bourdieu (1986) might also be useful in further clarifying notions ofphilosophical or written tastes, since it is clear that taste is not just amatter to guide philosophers but was associated with definite socialstrata and used in class closure, especially in excluding unwelcomemembers. Even avant­garde taste, which is displayed prominently in therhizomatic writing of Deleuze and Guattari (2004):
defined itself in a quasi­negative way, as the sum of the refusals ofall socially recognised tastes, refusal of the middle of the roadtaste… and especially… [that of] the petty bourgeoisie, [and] theteachers’ ‘pedantic taste’
 Popular reactions to avant­garde cultural politics included ‘confusion,sometimes almost a sort of panic mingled with revolt… [since eliteworks generally are] seen as a sort of aggression, an affront to commonsense and sensible people.’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 33), and this is a way of
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rejecting encounters with thought. Deleuze and Parnet can see a politicaldanger: ‘it is a disaster when [spokespersons] slip into a black hole fromwhich they no longer utter anything but the micro–fascist speech of theirdependency and their giddiness: “We are the avant­garde”, “We are themarginals”’ (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 139).
Radical theory, practice and pedagogy
Deleuzian work could be made more accessible, especially to non­elitereaders, including those who might be asked to join in a general politicalstruggle against bureaucracy. We might consider developing radicalphilosophy in pedagogic stages, instead of presenting an immediatecombination of Deleuzian concepts and practical experiences, which iswhat most of the educational applications offer. Rejecting elitism wouldinvolve designing pedagogically­informed settings, not necessarilybased in a university: theory and practice would be mediated by a thirdterm—open and rational pedagogy, based on adding stages to the modelsuggested by Spinoza, and working through them. It would have beenuseful here for Gale, St Pierre and Semetsky to tell us about theirpedagogy, especially how they negotiated the requirement for anyformal assessment. We could begin by considering what Deleuze himself suggests as aroute towards developing philosophical understanding. Deleuze admiresSpinoza’s notion of a ‘spiritual automaton’ (Deleuze, 1988) as alearning process. This is not learning that implies a knowledgeablesubject in the usual sense, of course. In the right conditions, theautomaton works on its own, as a ‘higher control which brings togethercritical and conscious thoughts and the unconscious thoughts’ (Deleuze1989, 165). We would need to modify the processes involved to developan active pedagogy, since the automaton also seems to produce an elite,as we shall see. At the first stage, people decide what are good and useful encountersonly through their feelings – intense excitement, goose bumps, elationor personal thrills might indicate we are on the right track, and induce usto proceed to the next stage. This involves developing what Spinozacalls ‘common notions’, links in thought between the experiences andunderstandings of others and our own. Spinoza saw that his first two
160 Harris ­ Deleuze and education
stages were accessible to most people and were provided by normalexperiences, including encounters with other people, and this is whereSemetsky saw parallels with Dewey. However, Deleuze and Spinozasuggest the final stage is fully philosophical thought, aimed at clarifying‘the spiritual’ – the nature of substance or reality in modern terms,where we work with purified philosophical concepts, revealing theirvalue in relation to other concepts, aiming at clarifying the interrelationsof the virtual and the actual. Deleuze agreed with Spinoza that'individuals are not equally capable of [developing to this stage]'(Badiou, 200: 13), perhaps thinking in terms of the scarcity ofintellectual ‘gifts’. We could introduce an intermediary pedagogical stage betweenstages two and three, to consider how philosophical thought might befurther encouraged, not forced or left to an automatic and selectiveprocess. Neither Spinoza nor Deleuze discuss ways in which thesecommon opinions might be made more systematic or critical beforeencountering philosophy, but social science applications seemparticularly appropriate as an intermediary step. Conventionaleducational research can clearly play a role here, for example byproducing empirical findings about lines of flight, connected to otherwork, as suggested above. There might be still further stages, involvingwork with critical social sciences based on marxist or feminist thoughtwhich begin to dereify existing reality. One more intermediary stage, briefly­discussed in Bourdieu andPasseron (1990), might involve reconstructing elite philosophy, to breakwith assumptions of universal interests or common cultural capital. Theproblem would be to retain the complexity and openness of academicwork and not reduce it to the banalities of, say, behavioural objectives,study skill routines, or teaching to the test. It is not just a matter ofsimplifying and popularising: Bourdieu (1993: 21) argues that ‘In orderto break with the social philosophy that runs through everyday wordsand also in order to express things that ordinary language cannotexpress…the [theorist]... has to resort to invented words which arethereby protected…from the naïve projection of common sense’. DeLanda’s commentary comes closest to this rational approach in thecase of Deleuzian work, it could be argued. His (2002) work is
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addressed specifically to scientists and mathematicians, while DeLanda(1991) addresses military historians and DeLanda (2006) sociologists.However, non­specialist readers are still not entirely excluded, and thereis an accessible series of European Graduate School lectures on video(DeLanda 2007). DeLanda (2002) attempts a ‘reconstruction of[Deleuze's] philosophy, using entirely different theoretical resources andlines of argument’ (DeLanda, 2002: 4). Inevitably, ‘There is a certainviolence which Deleuze’s texts must endure in order to be reconstructedfor an audience they were not intended for’ (2002: 8), but there is noalternative, since Deleuze himself often offers only a ‘compressed’account of these issues, one which ‘assumes so much on the part of thereader, that it is bound to be misinterpreted’ (2002: 5). DeLanda alsoomits, or places in footnotes, almost all of the elite cultural allusions inthe originals. Before accessing the original texts, DeLanda’s workwould offer a much more accessible route into Deleuzian philosophy. We can think, therefore, about expanding the three­stage model to asix stage chain linking experience with philosophy in the form of moremanageable steps. Deleuzians might even be able to see this scheme asmodel displaying a chain of explication or individuation. In presentcircumstances, the scheme can only be seen as utopian, however.
Autonomy and heteronomy
Rancière (2002) points out that the relation between radical theory andradical practice must be paradoxical. Radical theory must break withconventional thinking and aim at autonomy if it is to avoid beingdomesticated and managed. Even Deleuzian thought runs this risk,suggests Žižek (2000: 185): the global flows of capital from one taxhaven to another could be seen as rhizomatic; the Web could becomethe virtual; Capital is already the ‘concrete universal’; the nomadicsubjectivity that once seemed so important could be seen as materialisedin the form of portfolio careers and serial lifestyles. In thosecircumstances, Deleuze could become, ironically, the ‘ideologist ofdigital capitalism’ (Žižek, 2000: 184). To avoid this sort ofdomestication, radical thinking has to be couched in such unusuallanguage that it looks like something completely other than normal
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discourse, ‘heteronomous’ in Rancière’s terms, initially inaccessible toanyone who is not a scholastic philosopher. Rancière (2002: 150) argues that this paradox can never be fullyresolved, and no thinking and practice, however radical, can avoidexhaustion. Radical theory and practice can only be linked by constantly‘playing a heteronomy against an autonomy [and vice versa]… Playingone linkage between... [theory] and...[practice] against another suchlinkage’. All concerned must be able to discuss this constant tensionopenly, making explicit the role of judgments and taste (philosophicaland aesthetic, especially cinematic), and discussing the metapolitics ofputting radical theory to work.
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